Mindlessness attacks  by Zhu, Feng et al.
2351-9789 © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of AHFE Conference
doi: 10.1016/j.promfg.2015.07.174 
 Procedia Manufacturing  3 ( 2015 )  1066 – 1073 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com 
ScienceDirect
6th International Conference on Applied Human Factors and Ergonomics (AHFE 2015) and the 
Affiliated Conferences, AHFE 2015 
Mindlessness attacks 
Feng Zhua,*, Sandra Carpenterb, Swapna Kolimia 
aDepartment of Computer Science, The University of Alabama in Huntsville, Huntsville, Alabama, USA                                                   
bDepartment of Psychology, The University of Alabama in Huntsville, Huntsville, Alabama, USA 
Abstract 
In our daily life, we complete many tasks without paying much attention and thinking actively.  We have the tendency to be in 
this automatic cognitive state, which is known as mindlessness. Mindlessness can occur in interpersonal communication and can 
even occur when people interact with computers. We identify that mindlessness may be used as an attack. A website, for 
example, may exploit mindless behavior and acquire personal identity information. In our experiment, we designed a car 
insurance website that requested participants to provide their identity information. The mindlessness attacks successfully 
acquired identity information from more participants than the control condition. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
experimental study of mindlessness attacks in personal information requests.  
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1. Introduction 
 “Excuse me, may I use the Xerox machine because …?” It was an experiment that psychologists Langer, Bland, 
and Chanowitz conducted in front of a copy machine at their university [1]. The experimenters tried to get in front 
of a person who wanted to make a copy. They found that it did not matter whether the reason was sound (“because I 
am in a rush”) or not (“because I want to make a copy”); people were equally likely to offer the favor. But if the 
request was not followed by a reason, they found that people were less likely to comply.  
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Fig. 1. A screenshot of an Allstate car insurance web page from 2011.  
Complying with the request in the above scenario was considered a mindless behavior [1]. In interpersonal 
communication, one may mindlessly respond to sentence structures instead of the actual contents. Perhaps, the 
mindlessness behavior may happen when people interact with computers. 
Allstate Insurance Company’s car insurance website provided reasons why customers should provide their 
identity information. When a field was clicked or the mouse cursor was hovered over the field, a reason was 
displayed as shown in Figure 1. Many of the reasons do not seem to be sound.  (Allstate’s car insurance website was 
redesigned and the reasons are not currently provided.) This could be considered a mindlessness attack, and it 
provided a template and scenario for our mindlessness attack research. We wanted to study how much more likely 
people were willing to provide their private information under mindlessness conditions.  
Westin’s survey results have indicated that most people worry about their privacy (e.g., general privacy [2] and 
medical information [3]). Our previous research studied people’s attitudes towards keeping 26 identity elements 
private. It indicated that most people want to keep their sensitive identity information private [4].    
Studies have shown that more than 90% of commercial websites collect identity information [5]. Names, email 
addresses, home addresses, and phone numbers are the most common identity elements collected. Besides the 
identity information that can uniquely identify individuals, service providers collect additional information from 
users based on their interests. For example, health related websites, often sponsored by pharmaceutical companies, 
collect a great deal of medical information [6]. 
Anderson warned in his textbook that real attacks exploit psychology at least as much as technology [7]. In our 
research, we studied whether people behave mindlessly when unsound reasons are given for requesting personal 
identity information, by investigating the influence of a mindlessness attack on disclosure of identity information.  
We developed websites that provided “car insurance quotes” and also registered domain names for the sites. 
There were 45 people who participated in the mindlessness attack study. Our experiment showed that participants 
were more likely to provide identity information under the mindlessness attack condition. For instance, they were 4 
times more likely to provide driver license numbers than participants in the control (no attack) condition.  
Our key contribution is that the framing of personal information requests, inducing mindlessness, may be used as 
an attack. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first experimental study using a sentence structure on 
mindlessness as an attack. Our experiments show that mindlessness attacks may be effective to acquire people’s 
identity information.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We first discuss background and related work. Then, we describe 
the experimental design, method, key findings, and participants of the mindlessness attacks. Last, we outline our 
future work and our contributions. 
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2. Background and related work 
In this section, we provide more background information about mindlessness behaviors, identity exposure 
attitudes and behaviors, and psychological attacks on private information.  
2.1. Mindlessness and psychological studies 
Mindlessness occurs in a great deal of our daily behaviors. It is an automatic mode in which people complete 
their tasks [8-9]. In this mode, we do not consciously pay attention to our behaviors. These automatic behaviors may 
be simple motor acts, or even complex and intelligent acts, such as reading and writing [10]. 
Mindlessness and its counterpart, mindfulness, are a dimension of our cognitive functioning and physiological 
functioning [11]. In the mindless state, one does not attend to new signals and information in the current context, but 
relies on old categories, and acts from a single perspective [8].       
Studies have analyzed whether the degree of mindlessness in people differs with social variables such as moods 
and familiarity with tasks [12-14]. In general, people who are in a happy mood tend to process information by 
relying on general knowledge structures, which has a high correlation with performing a task at hand mindlessly. 
Another set of studies has indicated that familiarity with a certain task leads to the person being confident in their 
ability to repeat the task [15-16]. People “think” that they can perform the task more than adequately, which leads to 
the task being done in a mindless way.  
When interacting with computers, people also mindlessly apply social rules and expectations. In Nass and 
Moon’s studies [17], participants showed the same perceptions of gender stereotypes, ethnicity, and loyalty to 
groups in the human computer context. Their studies further showed that mindlessness is a deeply ingrained 
behavior because of over-learning (leading to automatic behavior). Participants in this research applied social rules 
to computers.  
2.2. Identity exposure attitudes and behaviors 
People in general worry about their privacy [2]. But several studies have shown that many people provide 
sensitive information such their income, investments, home addresses, etc. on the Internet without a reason [18-19]. 
Our research also showed that people’s identity exposure behaviors did not necessarily match their attitudes [4].  
We surveyed people’s privacy attitudes towards protecting 26 identity elements [4]. For some identity elements, 
everyone considered those to be very important to keep private (e.g., driver’s license number). Some elements (e.g., 
favorite TV programs) were considered by everyone as not at all important to keep private.  In addition, there are 
identity elements that some people considered important to keep private, while others did not think the same. In this 
mindlessness research, we selected six identity elements that at least many people think are important to keep 
private.    
2.3. Attacks based on psychology 
Many computer security and privacy attacks are based on psychology [7].  For example, social engineering 
attacks, such as social phishing, target Internet users and are widespread [20-21]. They are based on the 
psychological manipulation of victims for either a short period of time or an extended period of time. While some 
attacks have been studied in the recent years [22-23], many new types are expected to be invented [23-24].  
There are few studies on peoples’ identity exposure behaviors under psychological attacks and mitigations. Some 
of our previous research showed that reciprocity, a social norm that people take turns sharing personal information, 
may be used to effectively acquire people’s identity information [25]. Under the reciprocity attack condition, 
participants were 3 times more likely to expose their income information and 5 times more likely to expose their 
date of birth information.  
Other research has shown that people are more willing to provide personal information if explanations of privacy 
practices are explained effectively [26]. That is, informing people of how their information will be used increases 
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disclosure. The researchers built a website, ostensibly to recommend books on the basis of personal preferences. In 
this context they could request personal information in a realistic way. This research was conducted with the goal of 
better understanding how being transparent with privacy policies can increase data sharing and purchase behavior. 
The results, however, indicate that providing explanations for requests for personal information may be effectively 
used to increase disclosure of personal information. The current research builds on this foundation. 
3. The mindlessness attack experiment 
We hypothesized that participants in the mindlessness condition would provide more identity information than 
the participants in the control condition.  
In our mindlessness attack study, we asked participants for their identity information and provided them reasons 
for requesting the information, which may not be sound reasons. We conducted the experiments and follow-up 
surveys. We wanted to understand identity exposure behaviors under mindlessness attack and control conditions. 
We wanted to analyze the impact of the mindlessness attacks on identity exposure behavior. We selected six identity 
elements that people consider very important or extremely important to keep private and that were also related to the 
car insurance context.  
3.1. Participants 
We recruited participants through courses in the psychology department. We asked students to find one or two 
volunteers (parents, guardians, and friends) who were 30 years of age or older. The students were given 1 activity 
point for each volunteer that participated in the study. We believed that with the age limitation our participants 
would have had several years of driving experience and some car insurance purchasing experience.  
After a student found a volunteer, he or she emailed our lead researcher with the participant’s name, age, and 
email address. Then, our researcher emailed the participants directly with the link to our experiment website. The 
two websites (mindlessness attack or control) were randomly assigned to the participants. 
Our experiment was attended by total 45 people: 21 in the control condition and 24 in the mindlessness attack 
condition. Among the participants, 35.5% were male and 64.5% were female. The participants’ ages ranged from 30 
years of age to 65 years of age, with the average age being 46.5. The demographic information is as follows: 84.5% 
of them were White (not Hispanic), 15.5% were Black or African American. None of the participants reported being 
of Asian, Hispanic, or mixed heritage.   
The procedures of this experiment (and the other two experiments discussed in this paper) were approved by our 
university’s IRB. 
3.2. Websites and scenario 
We advertised the study as a beta test of a website for a car insurance company, which seemingly had 
collaborated with the university to recruit participants, without mentioning anything about our study of computer 
security and privacy. 
We registered a domain name. The website was hosted by godaddy.com. We also purchased a SSL certificate, 
and thus the communication between a participant and the website was over HTTPS.  
On the basis of what we learned from our previous computer security and privacy experiments, we wanted to 
reduce participants’ perception that studies conducted by the university were safe because this led participants to 
provide all of the information requested [25]. One approach that had been useful in our previous study was to 
present a disclaimer in the beginning of the study. On the webpage, we introduced a third-party, Auto Needs 
insurance company, which ostensibly created the website and collected the data. In addition, we stated that the 
university merely conducted the experiments for the insurance company.  
Participants accessed the website on the Internet and completed the study at their convenience. Nevertheless, we 
wanted participants to focus on the study and progress through the whole website and survey without breaks. A 
session would expire if a participant left the website unattended for an extended time period. In a separate email that 
we sent to the participants, we reminded them to complete their interaction with the website study in one sitting.  
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Fig. 2. Screenshot of a mindlessness attack.  
We used a mixed-method design to study participants’ identity exposure behavior and their privacy rationale. In 
the first part of the study, we presented the car insurance websites. The second part requested feedback about the 
quality of the website.  
For the first part, the websites requested that participants provide the type of information that is typical of 
commercial car insurance companies’ websites. They included six sections: driver’s information, insurance history, 
vehicle information, accidents and violation history, vehicle conditions and existing damages, and a quote for their 
car insurance.  Participants were asked to use the website, then evaluate its usability in accessing an immediate 
online auto insurance quote. 
We designed two versions of the car insurance website: the mindlessness attack condition website and the control 
condition website.  The two websites looked very similar.  They both had the same graphics, fonts, forms to request 
identity information, and order of the pages. The only difference was that in the mindlessness attack condition 
reasons were given (why participants should provide their identity information) as shown in Figure 2. 
We did not actually collect participants’ identity information or their other car insurance related information. 
Instead, we only recorded whether they provided information or not. Thus, their identity information was not 
transmitted over the Internet to the web server. As computer security and privacy researchers, we wanted to protect 
participants’ private information and not collect their information.   
In the feedback part of the study, we asked participants whether they had given their identity information to the 
car insurance website, whether they falsified the identity elements, or whether they only gave partial information. In 
this way, we knew the participants’ identity disclosure behaviors. That is, we could assess whether the participant 
had “faked” any of the information they had provided and, if so, why. In addition, we requested that participants 
provide demographic information and general opinion of the websites and asked them to rate the importance of the 
identity elements.   
After we completed the experiments, we emailed participants and debriefed them about the study. We explained 
that our goal in this research project was to understand identify exposure behaviors in the mindlessness and control 
conditions. We told them that their identity information was not collected and that the car insurance website was 
merely a way to attempt to collect identity information. 
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3.3. Mindlessness attacks 
The insurance websites requested that participants provide 24 pieces of information related to the car insurance 
quote. We provided reasons for all requested information. Among these pieces of information, we were particularly 
interested in the following identity elements: email address, driver’s license number, date of birth, phone number, 
home address, and zip code.  Table 1 shows the identity elements and reasons given for requesting the identity 
information. All requests started with: Why do I have to give this? Then, one or more reasons were given. For some 
elements, we grouped the messages together (e.g., home address and zip code).   
For many of these reasons provided, we mimic the reasons that were provided at the Allstate website. For other 
reasons, such as the ones used for email address and phone number, one may find that they are similar to the reasons 
used by other websites and stores. 
Table 1. Six identity elements and the reasons that were given for requesting information in the mindlessness experiment. 
Identity elements Reasons:  Why do I have to give this? 
Date of birth Age is one of the many factors that may influence your rates. 
Driver’s license number A long history of insurance coverage with no gaps may mean lower rates. If you were insured 
on someone else's policy, we count that as a part of your insurance history details. 
Email address You will receive an electronic copy of your quote, and we will not share your email address 
with any other companies and organizations. 
Phone number We may use it to look up your quote when you call us or use your phone number to contact you 
about a quote you started or received. 
Home address &  
Zip code 
Knowing your exact primary residence information helps us to accurately compare with 
consumer records, and give a cheaper quote. 
  
The reason given for requesting the participants’ date of birth might sound logical, but date of birth is much more 
precise than one’s age, which is all that is really needed for a car insurance quote. Similarly, home address and zip 
code are also specific information that can uniquely identify individuals. Giving this of information, however, may 
not guarantee that one will receive a cheaper or more accurate immediate online quote.  
While some reasons might be sound, others may not be reasonable or even related. For example, there was no 
specific reason given for requesting the driver’s license number. The driver’s license number field was grouped with 
the insurance history. The two reasons that provided were only related to one’s insurance history.    
Table 2. Number and percentages of participants providing identity information. * Asterisks indicate the percentage is 
significantly larger than the control group (p-value < 0.05). 
 Identity elements Control condition (21 participants) Mindlessness attack condition (24 participants) 
Date of birth 16 76% 22 91% 
Driver’s license number 9 43% 18 75%* 
Email address 16 76% 24 100%* 
Phone number 15 71% 19 79% 
Home address  16 76% 21 88% 
Zip code 20 95% 20 83% 
3.4. Results and analysis  
Whether more participants provided personal information in the mindlessness attack condition was the dependent 
variable of interest. If participants did not enter any information into the request text box, this was considered non-
disclosure. If participants did input information, we reviewed their responses to the post-website questionnaire that 
asked them whether they had faked any information while interacting with the website.  
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Overall, participants in the mindlessness condition exposed more information than participants in the control 
condition except for the zip code, as shown in Table 2. Driver’s license numbers were exposed the least, while other 
elements were exposed at a similar level.  Such behaviors partially match our survey data, in that people think a 
driver’s license number is one of the most important identity elements to keep private and that the other five 
elements are considered similarly important to keep private [4].      
The mindlessness version of the website successfully collected 75% of the participants’ drivers’ license numbers, 
whereas in the control condition only 43% of the participants shared their correct driver’s license numbers. Thus, the 
attack proved to be effective (Z-value = -2.30 and p-value = 0.011), as indicated by a Z-test comparing the 
proportions in the two conditions. The odds ratio that measures the influence of mindlessness attack was 4. That is, 
the odds of exposing the driver’s license number under the mindlessness attack were four times greater than for the 
participants who were not under the attack.  
The mindlessness attack also successfully collected email addresses from participants. All participants in the 
attack condition provided the information, whereas 72% of the participants in the control condition did so. It was 
also statistically significant (Z-value = -2.56 and p-value = 0.005). Since all participants provided email addresses in 
the mindlessness condition, the odds ratio approaches infinity. If the sample size were larger than what we had, there 
would likely be participants who did not provide the information. The odds ratio, in such a case, would be still large. 
That is, participants were highly likely to provide their email addresses. 
Although more participants gave their phone numbers in the mindlessness condition compared to the control 
condition (71% vs. 79%), the increase was not statistically significant. Similarly, in a separate study [25], 
participants were not more likely under a reciprocity attack to provide their phone numbers. Perhaps participants 
more frequently provide phone number information, since they are often asked for their phone numbers at checkout 
registers in stores. Participants who did not want to provide phone numbers frequently indicated, in the later survey, 
that they did not want to receive marketing calls.   
The differences of exposure for the other three identity elements – date of birth, address, and zip code – were not 
statistically significant across conditions. In this scenario, participants in the control condition exposed their identity 
information at a much more higher level than people’s general attitudes towards keeping these elements private [4].  
4. Conclusion and future work 
We identified that people’s mindless behaviors may be maliciously exploited. Our major goal in this research was 
to verify that a mindlessness attack may effectively acquire people’s private identity information. Our experiment 
showed that by giving reasons for requesting information, more participants provided their identity information. An 
unsound reason or even an unrelated reason may cause participants to expose more information. The mindlessness 
attack experiment was successful on some identity elements (email address and driver’s license number) and failed 
on others (date of birth, phone number, home address, and zip code). More research is needed to identify the 
relationships among the soundness of the mindlessness attack messages, the context, and the identity elements.  
Our study has a few limitations. First, as a computer security and privacy study, we wanted to learn participants’ 
behaviors and wanted to protect their privacy by not actually collecting their information. We relied on their honest 
responses and accurate recall of their accurate disclosure or information faking behaviors in the feedback section. 
Second, although we used a disclaimer and designed and deployed the websites that looked like a third-party was 
running them, several participants still stated in the feedback survey that they trusted university experiments and felt 
comfortable providing their information. If participants paid attention to the consent form, they would notice that 
there would be no harm to them and thus they might behave less cautiously. 
One of our ongoing research goals is to design mitigation approaches. We based our design on research of 
warnings. We tested warning messages with signal words and short messages. Specifically, we use the C-HIP model 
of information processing [27] as an investigative tool to determine the reasons why some warnings are successful 
and others are not, and why some warnings are more effective.  
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